Table 1. Instinctive Foreign Policy Positions of Six Schools of American Grand Strategy
a. From the middle of the Obama administration to the end of the Biden administration, the United States lost ground to the rise of Chinese power. See Blackwill and Fontaine, Lost Decade.
b. Although both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth view China as a regional and global security threat, President Donald Trump follows no perceptible geopolitical approach to China. A case in point is Trump’s decision to sell H200 advanced Nvidia chips to China.
c. Despite President Joe Biden asserting four times that the United States would directly defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, the State Department on each occasion walked back his comments in line with the doctrine of strategic ambiguity. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the daunting prospect of engaging China in a major war over Taiwan 81 miles from China and 6,800 miles from the continental United States would make liberal internationalists hesitate, particularly in the context of progressive influences on this grand strategy school.
d. Consistent with the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, Trump has refused to say whether he would defend Taiwan by military force. And even though the 2025 National Security Strategy has strong language on Taiwan, Trump has persistently pledged to the American people: no more wars.
e. At this writing, it is difficult to anticipate which way Trump’s policies will evolve on this subject. He periodically changes his position in a nighttime post only to reverse it a few days later.
f. Ibid.
g. Assuming that the enrichment levels are low (<5% U235), that this level is permanently frozen, and that it can be permanently verified.
h. Although liberal internationalist presidents frequently asserted that all options were on the table regarding the Iranian nuclear program, they put far more emphasis on solving the problem through negotiation than through military action. Most liberal internationalists condemned Trump’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025.
i. Trump used military force against three Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, 2025, but only after Israel destroyed Iran’s air defenses and severely damaged its nuclear facilities. Without those preconditions, Trump instinctively would have been unlikely to order the U.S. attack because it could have produced U.S. casualties.
j. Liberal internationalists abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2015 and did not seek to revive it during the Biden administration.
k. At this writing, it is not clear whether Trump will support restrictions through the rest of his term.
l. Primacists rarely address this subject.
b. Although both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth view China as a regional and global security threat, President Donald Trump follows no perceptible geopolitical approach to China. A case in point is Trump’s decision to sell H200 advanced Nvidia chips to China.
c. Despite President Joe Biden asserting four times that the United States would directly defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, the State Department on each occasion walked back his comments in line with the doctrine of strategic ambiguity. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the daunting prospect of engaging China in a major war over Taiwan 81 miles from China and 6,800 miles from the continental United States would make liberal internationalists hesitate, particularly in the context of progressive influences on this grand strategy school.
d. Consistent with the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, Trump has refused to say whether he would defend Taiwan by military force. And even though the 2025 National Security Strategy has strong language on Taiwan, Trump has persistently pledged to the American people: no more wars.
e. At this writing, it is difficult to anticipate which way Trump’s policies will evolve on this subject. He periodically changes his position in a nighttime post only to reverse it a few days later.
f. Ibid.
g. Assuming that the enrichment levels are low (<5% U235), that this level is permanently frozen, and that it can be permanently verified.
h. Although liberal internationalist presidents frequently asserted that all options were on the table regarding the Iranian nuclear program, they put far more emphasis on solving the problem through negotiation than through military action. Most liberal internationalists condemned Trump’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025.
i. Trump used military force against three Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, 2025, but only after Israel destroyed Iran’s air defenses and severely damaged its nuclear facilities. Without those preconditions, Trump instinctively would have been unlikely to order the U.S. attack because it could have produced U.S. casualties.
j. Liberal internationalists abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2015 and did not seek to revive it during the Biden administration.
k. At this writing, it is not clear whether Trump will support restrictions through the rest of his term.
l. Primacists rarely address this subject.
Source: Robert D. Blackwill
