Is the Philippines Investing Enough to Defend Its Waters?

Asia’s defense map reveals sharp contrasts. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's data (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, Singapore and South Korea devote over 3 percent of GDP to military spending, while China sustains nearly 2 percent to reinforce its regional power. Even mid-tier states like Thailand and Malaysia hover between 1.5 and 2 percent. The Philippines, by comparison, from 1987 to 2024 spent an average of just 1.5 percent—acutely modest for an archipelago with well known geostrategic vulnerabilities. There is no universally accepted “ideal” level of military spending, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cites 2 percent of GDP as a prudent benchmark for maintaining credible defense capability. Most Asian states now meet or approach this threshold; the Philippines in recent decades appears to be below it. Although the country has embarked on modernization efforts in recent years, much of its defense spending continues to support internal security and counterinsurgency rather than external defense. This inward focus reflects long-standing institutional priorities and fiscal trade-offs that favor domestic stability over maritime deterrence. For an archipelago with vast borders and disputed seas, however, this imbalance has strategic consequences. As regional militaries expand and tensions rise, the Philippines faces a pressing question: can alliances and diplomacy offset its continued underinvestment in defense?